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With architectural firms, owners are often managers whose characteristics may influence the
firm structure. This study investigated the relationships between ownership characteristics,
organizational structure, and performance of architectural firms. Utilizing a sample of
architectural firms from Nigeria, a questionnaire survey of 92 architectural firms was carried
out. Data were analyzed using multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) and regression analyses.
A generally low level of specialization of duties was observed even though professional service
firms were defined as highly specialized firms. For most of the firms, level of formalization was
moderate or high, while level of centralization was mostly low. Results revealed a direct
significant relationship between legal ownership form and formalization dimension of structure.
In addition, the centralization dimension of structure influenced firm performance. However, no
direct relationship between ownership characteristics and performance was noted, although
different fits of ownership characteristics and structural variables were observed. The results
suggest that principals of architectural firms should match their characteristics with the firm
structure to enhance performance in relation to profit.
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Southeast University.1. Introduction
What is the relationship between the ownership character-
istics of architectural firms, structure, and firm perfor-
mance? This research question guides this paper. In recent
times, researchers have investigated different forms of
ownership of professional service firms. Very relevant in
this context is the study by Greenwood and Empson (2003),
who attempted to determine why partnership forms of
ownership may be particularly effective for delivery ofand hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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been noted as a critical organizational variable in determin-
ing professional service firm outcomes (Kang and Sorensen,
1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no significant
relation between legal ownership structure and firm per-
formance. Thus, it will appear that ownership influences
other organizational factors, which in turn influence firm
performance. For architectural firms with owners cum
managers who are often not specially trained in organiza-
tional management, form of ownership may influence the
ways in which firms are organized. This is likely because the
way the owners organize their firms will depend on their
training and experiences. However, very few empirical
studies have been conducted on the subject, especially
in architectural firms, which have been noted to be peculiar
(Blau, 1984). Although structure has generally been described
in terms of specialization, centralization, and formalization
(Zhou and De Wit, 2009), there has been little description
of the structure of architectural firms in these terms. Even
less is known about the ways the ownership characteristics
of architectural firms are related to these structures and
to the performance of firms.
Description of the structure of architectural firms as well
as the relationship among ownership characteristics of
architectural firms, their structures, and their performance
are explored in this study. In particular, two questions are
addressed. First, how do architects (as owners of firms who
often also manage them) organize their firms? Second, what
types of relationships exist between the ownership and
structure of architectural firms and performance? By these,
the study is expected to provide empirical evidence of the
description of the structure of architectural firms in terms
of their centralization, formalization, and specialization,
which are dimensions by which organizational structure is
often described. The importance of this study also lies in its
potential to indicate how architectural firms fit their
structure to their ownership characteristics to enhance
profit.2. Literature review
Different ownership forms used in professional service firms
have been identified in literature. These include partner-
ship (Wilhelm and Downing, 2001; Pinnington and Morris,
2002; Greenwood and Empson, 2003); public corporation
(Schulze et al., 2003); and private corporations, namely,
limited liability and unlimited liability companies (Greenwood
et al., 2007). Greenwood and Empson (2003) describe
professional partnership as a form of ownership that repre-
sents an agreement between two or more persons, with
each partner being jointly and severally liable for the debts
of the other. Professional partnership is not a legal entity.
Greenwood and Empson (2003) further noted that although
private corporations share many characteristics of the
partnership in that senior professionals own private corpora-
tions, it is a legal entity. The limited liability company
provides the limited liability of a corporation and flexibility
of partnership. The basic difference between limited and
unlimited liability companies, according to Chappell and
Willis (2000), is that when faced with debt, shareholders of
an unlimited liability company contribute in the proportionof their shareholdings, while shareholders of limited liability
company have no further liability as the company simply
winds up. However, the ownership of the public company is
in the hands of the shareholding public, as the name implies
(Chappell and Willis, 2000), although professional registra-
tion bodies would insist that a professional should control
the company. This ownership form is excluded from this
study because owners of public corporations are not neces-
sarily the managers. One ownership form that has received
very little empirical study in the professional setting is sole
proprietorship.
Greenwood et al. (2007) referred to the firms with other
legal ownership forms apart from public corporations as
internally managed professional firms. They found differ-
ences in performance within these internally managed
professional service firms depending on whether they are
partnerships or private corporations. There were two rea-
sons given for expecting the partnership to perform better
than private corporations. The first was that partnerships in
professional service firms are reputed to be more client
interest-driven and less profit-driven than private corpora-
tions (Greenwood and Empson, 2003). For this reason,
Deephouse (2000) suggested that partnerships would attract
more clients, charge more for services, and record higher
performance. The second reason for expecting partnerships
to outperform private corporations was tendered by Greenwood
et al. (2007), who suggested that the wider scope of liability
of partnerships might lead to better management of those
firms, leading to higher performance.
The fact that ownership forms differ suggests that the
way the principals will organize their firms may differ based
on the ownership structure. One pointer to this is that Chua
et al. (2009) in their study of family firms found that the
structure of family firms vary from that of non-family firms.
The fact the owners of architectural firms are often not
trained in organizational management, yet they manage
their firms personally, may also suggest that the character-
istics of owners may influence firm structure. Previous
studies have found a correlation between managers’ char-
acteristics and firm performance. For example, Hitt et al.
(2001) and Pennings et al. (1998) found that education
and experience of managers influenced firm performance.
Within the construction industry, Fraser (2000) and Kim
and Arditi (2010) found that the educational level, involve-
ment in continuing education, number of firms worked for,
membership of professional bodies, and leadership style
influenced the performance of construction firms. With
architectural firms, however, these managers are often
the owners and the relationship may differ. It may therefore
be worthwhile to investigate the relationship between
ownership characteristics and structure of firms and the
attendant individual and combined effects on the perfor-
mance of architectural firms.
The foregoing discussed studies on the influence of own-
ership characteristics and performance as well as ownership
characteristics and structure. In addition to these relation-
ships, however, a number of factors have been hypothesized
to moderate the relationship between ownership and per-
formance. One of such factors is number of hierarchical
levels (Durand and Vargas, 2003). Greenwood and Empson
(2003) suggested that formal hierarchies and bureaucratic
controls are unlikely to succeed in a professional service
A.A. Oluwatayo, D. Amole96firm because the professional staff is expected to have
autonomy and freedom to perform well. They suggested
that the partnership and private corporation professional
service firms would perform well because they use collegi-
ate rather than hierarchical controls. This suggests that
flatter hierarchies may outperform multi-layered ones.
Hierarchy is an aspect of structure that represents the level
of centralization of decision-making in architectural firms.
This is an aspect of structure defined by Willem and Buelens
(2009) as the extent to which decision-making power is
concentrated in top management level of the organization.
Pertusa-Ortega et al. (2010) suggested that decentralization
involving the distribution of authority fosters the incorpora-
tion of a greater number of individuals in the management
of the organization. They suggested that decentralization
enables members of organizations to act autonomously,
thereby fostering better business opportunities. On the
contrary, centralization reduces generation of creative
solutions as experimentation and circulation of ideas are
reduced. Going by this observation, one would expect that
high centralization would lead to poor performance in
creative firms such as architectural firms.
Structure, according to Zhou and De Wit (2009), is the
way in which an organization organizes and coordinates its
works. In addition to centralization, other dimensions of
structure are formalization and specialization. Specializa-
tion has been referred to as complexity by Pertusa-Ortega
et al. (2010), and departmentalization by Zhou and De Wit
(2009). It is the extent to which organizational tasks are
divided into subtasks and people are allocated to execute
only one of these subtasks. High-level specialization exists
when each person performs only a limited number of tasks,
while low-level specialization implies that people perform a
range of different and frequently changing tasks. Formali-
zation, on the other hand, is the extent to which the rights
and duties of the members of the organization are deter-
mined and the extent to which these are written down in
rules, procedures, and instructions. Architectural firms are
professional service firms where professionals have auton-
omy on aspects of the work under their control, according
to Mills et al. (1983). This suggests that decision-making
in such organizations is decentralized. However, a high
degree of specialization of duties and formalization of
office procedures may exist. These have yet to be proven
empirically.
Based on the literature review, the present study inves-
tigates a four-way relationship. Direct relationships are
expected between ownership characteristics and structure,
ownership characteristics and performance, as well as struc-
ture and performance. The fourth relationship expected
pertains to interaction effects of ownership and structure
on performance.3. Research methods
Architectural firms included in the study were selected from
the 342 firms listed in the Register of architectural firms
licensed to practice in Nigeria (ARCON, 2006). A total of 157
were selected from the list of 342 firms. Sampled firms were
randomly selected from six cities where 77.7% of firms were
located. These cities were Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna, Enugu,Port Harcourt, and Ibadan. Firms selected were those that
carried out core architectural services and were headed by
registered architects. Principals of the firms were asked to
fill out the questionnaires. Questionnaires were adminis-
tered between February and May 2008, with the aid of 15
field assistants. Only 92 questionnaires were returned,
representing a response rate of 58.6%.
One of the limitations of the study was the difficulty in
locating most of the firms at the addresses indicated on the
register (ARCON, 2006). Moreover, many principals refused
to fill the questionnaires, citing time constraints.
Firms in the study were asked to indicate the tasks
performed exclusively by at least one staff member. Exis-
tence of departments within the firms was investigated as
well. These two questions will suggest the level of specia-
lization within the firms. For the level of formalization of
office procedures, firms were asked to rate how formal
seven office procedures were on a Likert scale of 1–3.
Informal office procedures were rated as 1, fairly formal
office procedures as 2, and very formal office procedures as
3. Rating of formalization for all activities was added for
each firm and re-coded. Total scores ranged from 7 to 21.
Totals ranging between 7 and 11 were re-coded as
informal, 12 to 16 as fairly formal, and between 17 and 21
as very formal. Firms were asked to indicate persons who
formulated decisions on certain issues within the firm. This
was ranked in order of seniority from 1 to 6 for any staff,
any administrative staff, any architect, administrative
manager, senior architect, and principal partner, respec-
tively. Level of centralization of decision-making within the
firms was obtained from this. Scorings between were re-
coded: 8 and 16 as low degree of centralization; 17–32 as
moderate degree of centralization; and between 33 and 48
as high degree of centralization. These are represented in
Table 1.
Firm performance was measured in terms of the perception
of the firms’ profit in the last 2 years. Perception of the
principals was adopted because of paucity of data on actual
profits of the firms; the principals were not willing to divulge
such information. Perception of the principals was adopted
because Wall et al. (2004) found that subjective measures of
performance obtained from top management were as valid
as objective measures. Ownership characteristics of the firms
were measured using the legal structures of firms, gender,
age, qualification, experience, and leadership styles of the
principals.
Prevalent levels of structural dimensions are presented in
frequencies. This gave an idea of how architectural firms
generally organized their firms in terms of centralization,
specialization, and formalization. Multiple analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was performed to investigate the direct influence of
ownership characteristics on the structural variables. This is
because the structure entered as the dependent variable had
more than one dimension. To investigate the dimensions of
structure that influenced firm performance, regression analysis
was carried out. To investigate the direct influence of owner-
ship characteristics of performance and the interaction effect
of ownership characteristics and structure on performance,
hierarchical regression analysis was performed. This was to
ensure that direct effects of ownership characteristics and
structure are first removed before the interaction effect is
investigated.
Table 1 Variables in the study.
Construct Variables
Ownership Legal structure of firm, age,
gender, educational
qualification, and
experience of the founding
principal
Specialization Number of tasks exclusively
performed by at least one
staff
Existence of departments
Formalization (1—informal,
3—very formal)
Communication with staff
within the office
Communication with other
professionals
Communication with clients
Financial matters and
budgeting
Management decisions
Staff working conditions
and job descriptions
Meetings in the office
Centralization of decision-
making (1—any staff,
8—principal of firm)
How to acquire new jobs
and clients
Collaborations with other
firms
Management of non-design
staff
Fees to be charged for
projects
Hiring/promotion of
architects
Design ideas to be used in
projects
Managing projects
Salaries of staff
Firm performance Perception of the profit of
the firm in the last 2 years
Table 2 Profile of respondents
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2008).
Firm profiles Percentage of
occurrence
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP
Sole principal 52.3
Partnership 21.6
Unlimited liability company 8.0
Limited liability company 18.1
GENDER OF PRINCIPAL
Male 89.8
Female 10.2
AGE OF PRINCIPAL
Below 30 years 1.2
31–40 years 22.4
41–50 years 43.5
51–65 years 27.1
Above 65 years 5.9
HIGHEST QUALIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL
HND 3.5
BSc 3.5
MSc 43.5
BArch 42.4
Others 7.1
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF ARCHITECT
1–5 years 1.5
6–10 years 12.1
11–15 years 15.2
16–20 years 18.2
21–25 years 21.2
26 years and above 31.8
MANAGEMENT STYLE OF PRINCIPAL
A mentor in the firm 9.3
A visionary and innovative
leader
38.4
An efficient manager 11.6
A productivity-oriented
achiever
40.7
LEVEL OF SPECIALIZATION
No specialization of task 9.5
Very few tasks are
specialized
41.7
Moderate level of
specialization
21.4
High specialization of tasks 19.0
Very high specialization
of tasks
8.3
EXISTENCE OF DEPARTMENTS
Departments exist 45.9
Departments do not
exist
52.9
Not sure 1.2
LEVEL OF FORMALIZATION OF OFFICE PROCEDURES
Low formalization 16.3
Moderate formalization 45.0
High formalization 38.8
LEVEL OF CENTRALIZATION OF DECISIONS
Decentralized 40.3
Moderate centralization 31.9
High centralization 27.8
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Sole principals (Table 2) owned most of the firms that
responded to the questionnaire. Most of the principals were
men and the age range of the responding principals were
mostly 41 years and above. Most of the principals had the
Bachelor of Architecture or Master of Science in Architec-
ture, which in Nigeria are equivalent professional degrees
required to practice architecture. The principals were quite
experienced, with years of experience mostly 16 years and
above. Most of the principals were visionary and innovative
leaders, or productivity-oriented achievers. Level of spe-
cialization of duties was mostly low, with just about half
of the firms having departments. Level formalization of
office activities was mostly moderate to high, while only
about a quarter of the firms exhibited high centralization of
decisions.
Table 2 (continued )
Firm profiles Percentage of
occurrence
PERCEPTION OF THE FIRM’S PROFIT
Not so good 28.1
Very good 71.9
A.A. Oluwatayo, D. Amole98A one-way between groups multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was performed to investigate how the
ownership characteristics of the architectural firms influ-
enced their structure. The independent variables were the
ownership characteristics of the firms, while the dependent
variables were the dimensions of structure investigated in
the study. From the results, influence of the ownership
characteristics of the firms on their structure was signifi-
cant. (F(3,63)=1.35, po0.05, Wilks’ Lambda=0.83, partial
eta squared=0.62). The test of between-subjects effects
shows that only the formalization of office procedures was
significantly influenced by the legal ownership forms of the
firms (F(3,63)=3.12, po0.05, partial eta squared=0.13).
Mean scores of the firms on formalization were used to plot
a graph based on their legal ownership forms. Fig. 1
demonstrates that most of the architectural firms with
the sole principal ownership form operated the low
level of formalization, while most of the partnership and
unlimited liability firms operated moderate to high levels of
formalization.
Regression analysis of the direct relationship between
organizational structure and performance also indicated a
significant relationship (R2=0.108, po0.05). In particular,
centralization of decisions dimension of structure signifi-
cantly influenced firm performance. Mean performance
scores of the firms by the level of centralization of decisions
in Fig. 2 show that most of the architectural firms with
decentralized decision-making performed best, while those
with highly centralized structure were the least performers.
However, no direct relationship between the ownership
characteristics of the firms and their performance in profit
was observed.
Investigating the interaction effects of the structure and
ownership characteristics of the firms on their performance
was important in this study as well. Hierarchical regression
analysis was therefore used to investigate the relationship
among ownership, structure, and performance of the firms.
Structural variables were entered first to control for any
effect that structure may have on performance. A signifi-
cant effect may indicate the presence of a direct relation-
ship. Ownership characteristics were entered second to
investigate the direct relationship between ownership char-
acteristics and firm performance. With these, the main
effects were eliminated before the interaction effect
of ownership and structure on firm performance was
investigated.
Interaction between ownership characteristics and
structure were entered in the third step. Significant
effect here would indicate that the relationship between
ownership and performance is moderated by the firm
structure. Results of the hierarchical regression analysisfor performance are displayed in Table 3. Results show
that firm structure was significantly related to perfor-
mance (R2 change=0.108, po0.05), accounting for 10.8%
of the variance in firm performance. Centralization of
decision-making (Wald=6.875, p=0.009) was the variable
that significantly influenced performance. With the struc-
ture controlled, however, the ownership characteristics
did not significantly influence the performance of the
firms. This suggests no direct influence of the ownership
characteristics on the performance of the firms.
Ownership characteristics/structure interaction, on the
other hand, accounted for significant incremental variance
(R2 change=0.348, po0.001), resulting in a further 34.8%
difference in performance. This result suggests that
although ownership characteristics may not have directly
influenced the performance of the firms, these character-
istics interact with the structure of the firms to influence
performance. Ownership characteristics that interacted
with the specialization dimension of structure was the
experience of the principal (Wald=4.156, p=0.041), while
the formalization of office procedures interacted with the
legal structure of the firms (Wald=4.21, p=0.040) to
influence performance. Ownership characteristics that
interacted with the centralization dimension of structure
to influence performance are age (Wald=3.220, p=0.092)
and management styles of the principal (Wald=3.615,
p=0.082).
A closer look at the data (Fig. 3) reveals that firms that
had principals with very few years of experience per-
formed well with low level of specialization, while
principals with experience greater than 10 years per-
formed better with higher levels of specialization. Data
likewise reveal that firms owned by sole principals per-
formed well with high levels of formalization, while firms
with the partnership or limited liability forms of owner-
ship performed well with lower levels of formalization
(Fig. 4). In addition, having a principal who is a visionary
and innovative leader and operating high level of cen-
tralization resulted in good performance (Fig. 5); firms
with principals whose leadership style was mentorship or
productivity orientation performed well when they oper-
ated low level of centralization of decisions. The results
(Fig. 6) further show that firms owned by young principals
aged between 31 and 40 years performed better when
they operated high levels of centralization of decisions.
With older principals, however, firms performed better
when they operated lower levels of centralization of
decisions.
Levels of centralization of decision interacted with
the management style and age of the principal to influ-
ence performance. Fig. 6 shows that firms with mentors
or productivity-oriented achievers as principals per-
formed better when they operated lower levels of cen-
tralization of decision. On the contrary, firms with
visionary and innovative leaders as principals performed
better when they operated higher levels of centralization
of decisions. Firms owned by young principals between
31 and 40 years likewise performed better when they
operated high levels of centralization of decisions.
With older principals, however, firms performed better
when they operated lower levels of centralization of
decisions.
Fig. 1 Legal structures of the firms by the level of formalization of office procedures.
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2008).
Fig. 2 Level of centralization of decisions and perception of firm success.
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2008).
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Although sole principal-owned professional service firms have
been accorded little attention in previous studies, this legal
ownership form is most predominant in this study. This maybe an evidence of the quest for job creation engendered
by the prevalent high unemployment rate currently recorded
in Nigeria. It also possibly suggests that architecture as
a profession is easily sustained as individual practice.
The profile likewise suggests a predominant male ownership.
Table 3 Results of simultaneous hierarchical regression analysis for performance.
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2008).
Variables Performance Wald
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Structure Specialization of duties 2.094 1.289 3.716c
Formalization of office procedures 2.704 3.208c 2.835
Centralization of decision-making 6.875a 5.046b 1.807
Ownership Experience of principal 0.153 2.735c
Gender of principal 0.128 2.450
Age of principal 0.028 3.058c
Highest qualification of principal 2.255 1.455
Management style of principal 1.584 3.678c
Legal structure of firm 0.072 4.629b
Structure/ownership interaction Experience of principal specialization 4.156b
Gender of principal specialization 2.420
Age of principal specialization 3.024
Qualification of principal specialization 2.854
Management style of principal specialization 2.583
Legal structure of firm specialization 0.373
Experience of principal formalization 2.051
Gender of principal formalization 3.197
Age of principal formalization 2.840
Highest qualification of principal formalization 2.999
Management style of principal formalization 0.007
Legal structure of firm formalization 4.210b
Experience of principal centralization 0.846
Gender of principal centralization 1.738
Age of principal centralization 3.220c
Highest qualification of principal centralization 0.142
Management style of principal centralization 3.615c
Legal structure of firm centralization 2.173
R2 change 0.044 0.348a
R2 0.108a 0.152 0.500a
apo0.01, two-tailed test.
bpo0.05, two-tailed test.
cpo0.10, two-tailed test.
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and management of architectural firms may be too tedious
for women. About three-quarters of the firms were owned by
principals aged above 40 years, suggesting that most of the
principals may have gained experience elsewhere before
starting their own firms. This is possibly also indicated by
the findings that almost 90% of the principals held above
10 years of experience.
Although Mills et al. (1983) suggested that professional
service firms would exhibit a high level of specialization,
most architectural firms in the study exhibited low to
moderate levels of specialization. This may suggest that
although professional services are specialized services
requiring professionals who specialize in their tasks, profes-
sionals performed more than one task within the architec-
tural firms in the study. In addition, the low to moderate
levels of specialization was observed in the data in spite ofthe fact that almost half of the firms indicated having
departments. It is possible that even within the depart-
ments, the staff continues to multi-task. It may be insightful
to investigate the types of departments that exist in
architectural firms and the manner by which they operate.
In line with the suggestion of Mills et al., however, the level
of centralization in most of the firms was generally not so
high. This is because most of the firms either were
decentralized or exhibited a moderate level of centraliza-
tion. This possibly suggests that professionals in the firms
were given free hand to operate as well as to participate in
the administration of the firms. Most of the firms likewise
exhibited moderate to high levels of formalization. This
suggests that although the professionals had a free hand to
operate in most of the firms, they had written guidelines.
Interaction effects between ownership and structure gen-
erated interesting results. First, ownership characteristics did
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tion aspects of structure. This suggests that other variables of
the firm, apart from ownership characteristics, may influencethese dimensions of structure. However, level of formalization
of office activities was influenced by the legal form of
ownership. The reason why most of the sole principal firms
Fig. 5 Level of centralization of decisions, leadership style of principals, and perception of firm success.
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2008).
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A.A. Oluwatayo, D. Amole102exhibited the lowest level of formalization may be that they
are not incorporated and therefore may not need to report
their activities to any regulatory body. In addition, there is no
second party to question whatever the sole principal does as
such a person holds sway and may change rules at will.However, this is not the case with firms that had other forms
of ownership. While partnerships report to partners, limited
and unlimited liability firms are required by the Corporate
Affairs Commission to keep records and submit them on
occasion.
103Ownership, structure, and performance of architectural firmsAs earlier noted, Pertusa-Ortega et al. (2010) suggested
that decentralization enables members of organizations to
act autonomously, thereby fostering better business oppor-
tunities. This appears to be the case as decentralized firms
performed best, suggesting that the inputs of professionals
in architectural firms are highly important in running the
firms to achieve best performance. Moreover, it possibly
suggests that when architectural firms allow their employ-
ees to participate in management, they profit more. It is not
immediately clear why the levels of specialization and
formalization do not directly influence firm performance.
However, it is possible that these dimensions of structure
work through other factors in influencing the performance
of architectural firms.
In line with the findings of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001),
the legal form of ownership of the firms as well as other
ownership characteristics of architectural firms did not
directly influence firm performance in terms of profit. This
appears contrary to the findings of Fraser (2000) and Kim
and Arditi (2010) on managers of construction firms. How-
ever, it suggests that influence of managers who are owners
on firm performance may differ from the influence of
managers who are not owners.
Based on the results, one can infer that the influence of
ownership characteristics on performance is more in terms
of interaction with other variables than direct influence.
This is because the interaction of ownership characteristics
and structure accounted for 34.8% of variance in perfor-
mance in profits. Level of specialization, for example, which
had no significant direct influence on firm performance,
interacted with the years of experience to influence the
firms. Poor performance recorded by firms when low
experience of principals is combined with high level of
specialization of firms may be explained. One reason why
this may be so is that these principals are possibly merely
starting off and, as such, the cost incurred by having one
person exclusively in charge of any duty may not be
balanced by the benefits to be derived from such specializa-
tion. With principals having more than 10 years experience,
however, the firms performed better when they operated
higher levels of specialization. An explanation for this may
be that the experiences of these principals and possibly a
highly specialized workforce place them at an advantage to
attract specialized projects, which may often attract higher
profits. Firms with experienced principals but lower specia-
lizations of tasks may not be able to attract such jobs or
may have to sublet part of such jobs if they attract them,
reducing the profits that may accrue to them.
Another way that the interaction of ownership character-
istics and structure influenced performance was in terms of
the way certain legal structures suited particular levels of
formalization and resulted in better performance of the
architectural firms. Although Greenwood and Empson (2003)
explained that professional partnerships are expected to
perform better because they are more likely to attract more
clients and charge more fees because they are more client-
oriented than private corporations, the findings of this study
show that partnerships that adopt a high level of formalization
perform better than those that adopt a low level of formaliza-
tion. The same applies to limited liability companies as well.
However, the opposite applies to sole principal firms. These
results suggest that the level of formalization often associatedwith particular legal structures may need to be moderated for
better performance. This is because when one person owns a
firm, there is a tendency that there will be no agreement,
rules, or regulations. The fact that the sole principal owned
firms in the study performed better with higher levels of
formalization of office procedures may therefore be explained
by the fact that a higher level formalization than would be
expected of such firms may help to coordinate activities, and
thus reduce waste and inefficient procedures, leading to
savings and increased profits. However, such firms may lose
profit through lower formalization levels as only one principal
may not adequately achieve efficiency, with tasks performed
unsystematically. With partnerships and limited liability com-
panies in the study, which are often expected to have written
agreements, codes of practice, and procedures, better per-
formance is recorded when those rules and procedures are
played.
Another interaction effect on performance was recorded
with level of centralization and leadership styles as well as
the age of the firms. Although it had been found earlier that
firms with decentralized structure performed best while
firms with highly centralized structure performed worst, it
appears this may also be situational. Why firms with
principals that were visionary and innovative leaders per-
formed better with high levels of centralization is unclear,
since innovation of architectural firms is often linked to the
professional workforce (Brown et al., 2010). Therefore, it
will be expected that the staff is allowed to participate in
decision-making to achieve higher innovation. The results,
however, suggest that this innovation is not independent but
coordinated. This is possibly because having a leader who is
visionary and innovative may suggest that the firm pursues
new ideas, which may not lend itself to discussion. This
follows from the fact that following new ideas to gain profit
may necessitate being the first in the market and thus
taking immediate actions, which only the principals can
effect. Higher levels of centralization may lead to faster
actions and thus profit benefits of being the pacesetter.
Firms with principals described as either mentors or
productivity-oriented achievers may have performed better
with lower levels of centralization for certain reasons. It
appears that firms with mentors as leaders may be better
off when staff members are allowed to participate in
decision-making. This may be because a mentor may often
invest time and resources in helping the staff learn the
business to be able to hold sway even when the owner is not
around. One may expect that this kind of system will run
better and be more productive with input of many who also
represent the firm in words and actions. With higher levels
of centralization of decisions, however, mentor-led firms in
the study did not perform well. This is possibly because the
gains of staff training may not have been harnessed to offset
the cost in time and resources.
The result for firms owned by productivity-oriented
achievers is similar. The result also suggests that firms
owned by productivity-oriented achievers may also per-
form better when they allowed others, who are possibly
also professionals in the field, to bring their ideas to the
table by participating in running the firms. Another
finding from the study is that firms with principals aged
between 31 and 40 years performed better with higher
levels of centralization. One explanation for this may be
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have grown to be experienced professionals whom they
can trust to make the right decisions in their payrolls.
Leaving decision-making to unqualified persons may lead
to losses. Decentralization, however, works best for firms
with principals older than 40, who may have grown to
have more qualified professionals on their payroll and are
confident enough to leave the running of the firms in the
hands of others.
6. Conclusions
This study described the structure of architectural firms in
Nigeria in terms of centralization, specialization, and forma-
lization. An important finding is that a generally low level of
specialization was observed. Thus, it appears that although
architectural firms are engaged in trading specialized knowl-
edge, professionals may multi-task within the firms them-
selves. Specialization often referred to in literature may be
more in terms of overall tasks rather than the internal
operations of firms. However, this needs to be investigated
in the context of other professional service firms.
Relationships among ownership characteristics, organiza-
tional structure, and performance of architectural firms were
investigated as well. Three of the relationships in the
conceptual framework were found to be significant (Fig. 3).
The relationship between ownership characteristic and per-
formance was found to be insignificant, confirming the
findings of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in the context of
architectural firms. The findings also confirmed the findings of
previous authors that the level of centralization influences
firm performance. In particular, decentralization was
observed in most high-performing firms. Although previous
studies found significant relationships between managers’
characteristics and performance, the findings of this study
also suggest that no significant relationship exists between
characteristics of principals who are both owners and man-
agers and the performance of architectural firms. However,
this is non-conclusive and requires further investigation.
Findings of this study have implications for practice.Findings suggest that certain fits of structure and owner-
ship characteristics lead to better performance. One such
fit is that high level of specialization leads to higher
profit, except in firms headed by principals with very few
years of experience. This suggests a need for architec-
tural firms in Nigeria to reduce the levels of multi-tasking
to record better performance in profit, except where the
principals are not sufficiently experienced to manage the
process. The fact that most architectural firms in the
study exhibited low levels of centralization of decisions
and most firms that performed well in terms of profit possibly
recorded these low levels of centralization also has implica-
tions for the practice of the profession. This is especially true
in light of the fact that all profitable firms in the study, except
those with principals aged between 31 and 40 years or whose
leadership style is visionary and innovative, recorded low
centralization of decision-making. This suggests a need for
architectural firms to allow inputs of other professionals in the
firms in their decision-making process, except when it ham-
pers the vision of the owner or the stage of life of the owner
implies reduced capability to harness the input of others. In
addition, it appears that architectural firms may need to
moderate their required levels of formalization of office
procedures as required by the laws setting them up to achieve
greater success. This is because, where high level of forma-
lization is ordinarily required, lower levels of formalization
make for better success and vice versa. This can possibly
explain why a generally moderate level of formalization of
office procedures was observed among the architectural firms
in the study.
There are a few limitations to this study. First, the
study was performed in Nigeria. There may be a need to
conduct similar studies in other countries so that the
results can becompared to establish the limits of general-
ization. Another limitation to this study is the unavail-
ability of data on the profit of the firms, urging the
researchers to rely on the perception of the principals,
which Walls et al. (2004) noted as a valid measurement of
profit as well. Future studies may consider more objective
measures of profit.Appendix
Questionnaire
Dear Sir/Madam,
Kindly give candid answers to the questions below. The questionnaire is designed to collect information on the
organizational structure of architectural firms in Nigeria. I would be grateful if the principal or a senior partner completes
the questionnaire. Please be assured that the information, which you will provide, will be treated in strict confidence and
the results will be published only in an aggregated form. Your firm will remain anonymous.
Thank you.
General instruction
Please answer the following questions by ticking the relevant answers. Some questions may require you to circle one
answer only, whereas others may request you to circle more than one number. The numbers beside the answers are for
official use only.
105Ownership, structure, and performance of architectural firmsSection A: (Organizational profile)
Section A11. How would you describe the form of ownership of this firm?
Sole principal [1] Partnership [2] Unlimited liability company[3]
Limited liability company [4] Public company [5] Not Sure [6]2. What is the sex of the principal partner? Male [1]Female [2]
3. Please tick the age group of the principal partner.
Below 30 [1] 31–40 [2] 41–50 [3] 51–65 [4] Above 65 [5]
4. What is the highest qualification of the principal partner in architecture?
HND [1] BSc [2] MSC[3] BArch [4] Others [5] (specifyyyyyy.y)
5. How would you describe the principal?
A mentor in the firm [1] A visionary and innovative leader [2]
An efficient manager [3] A productivity oriented achiever [4]
Others [5] (Please specifyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy.)
6. What is your perception of the success of your firm’s profit in the last 2 years?
Very good [1] Good [2] Fair [3] Not so good [4] Very Poor [5]
7. Does the firm have departments/work units (accounting, personnel, transportation, etc)?
Yes [1]No [2] Not sure [3]
8. Which of the following activities are dealt with exclusively by at least one full time personnel? (Please tick as many as
apply)
a. Public/clients relations d. Sourcing for job g. Transport j. Modeling
b. Personnel e. Maintenance h. Training k. Site meetings
c. Working drawing f. Accounts i. Designe l. Welfar9. How formal (written or documented) are the following office tasks?
Task Informal [1] Fairly formal [2] Very formal [3]
a. Communication with staff within the office
b. Communication with other professionals outside the office
c. Communication with clients
d. Financial matters and budgeting
e. Management decisions
f. Staff working conditions and job descriptions
g. Meetings in the office10. Who usually takes decisions about the following?
Issues requiring
decisions
Principal
partner[1]
Senior
architects[2]
Any
architect[3]
Admin. manager/
accountant[4]
Any admin
staff[5]
Any
staff[6]
a. How to get new jobs
and clients
b. Collaborations with
other firms
c. Managing the non-
design staff
d. Fees to be charged for
projects
e. Hiring/promotion of
architects
f. Design ideas to use in
projects
g. Managing projects
h. Salaries of staff
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